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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF U'lAJI 
---------------------
STATE OF UTAH and JOANN 
LORRAINE CLARK, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs-
MARK THOMAS CLARK, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
and 
STATE OF UTAH and SHARON 0. BOWEN,: 
-vs-
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
BOWEN, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
OF UTAH and MARY O. VIGIL, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
ALFONSO M. VIGIL, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
- - - - - - - - - -·- ~ -. 
Appeal frOID the District 
the Honorable Calvin ..,.., .. ,~,, 
CUS'l'EN, ESQ~ ·, · 
~4th Street , 
Utah 
for Respondents 
.. 
.• 
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~ry o. Vigil, Joann Lorraine Clark, and Sharon 0. Bowen, appeal 
from memorandum decisions entered in the District Court of weber 
county, State of Utah granting summary judgment of dismissal of 
the complaints under U.C.A. 78-45-l et.seq. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Appellants brought separate actions in the District 
Court of Weber County, the Honorable Calvin Gould, presiding, 
for reimbursement of funds expended for public assistance, under 
Utah Code An nota ted § 78-45-9 ( 195 3) as amended. All three 
cases were heard together on a motion for summary judgment by the 
defendants, on April 30, 1975. 
Arguments of counsel for both plaintiffs and defendants 
~represented and defendants' motion for summary judgment was 
granted. The court issued identical memorandum decisions in each 
of the three cases, holding that plaintiffs could not recover 
reimbursement under U.C.A. 78-45-9, as amended, and would not be 
entitled to a judgment for a sum certain without first obtaining 
a court order specifying the amount of monthly support. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the memorandum decisions and 
petition the Court to vacate the orders granting summary 
-2-
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judgment with instructions to re-hear the cases under u.C.A. 
78-45-9, consistent with the directive of this court in the 
~otter. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are substantially the same in all three cases, 
and are not in dispute. In each case, the defendant-obligor 
abandoned his family, leaving them without support and dependant 
upon the State of Utah to provide assistance. There was no 
divorce or sep~rate maintenance order decreed by the court in 
any of the three cases. There has never been any child support 
or sum certain of support ordered by any court to be paid by the 
respondents, nor have any of the respondents paid any. Thus, 
the appellants were forced to seek and receive assistance for 
their families from the Utah State Department of Social Services. 
In the Bowen case, for instance, Plaintiff Sharon 0. Bowen 
received assistance from November 1972 through February 1973, 
receiving a total of $616.00. Under U.C.A. 78-45-9, as amended, 
the State of Utah is granted derivative rights to seek reimburse-
ment from obligors who fail to support their obligees and thereby 
force the State to assume the burden. Therefore, the State of 
Utah sought reimbursement of a sum certain of $616.00 from 
defendant-obligor, Kim R. Bowen; the same basis exists for the 
other two cases as well. 
-3-
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Judge Gould of the Weber County District Court ruled that 
such reimbursement cannot be enforced for a sum certain without 
a prior court order specifying the amount of monthly support. 
From this decision, the Appellants appeal the decision of the 
District court. 
ARGU!1ENT 
POINT I 
A FATHER IN THE STATE OF UTAH HAS A DUTY OF SUPPORT TO 
CHILDREN, INDEPENDENT OF ANY COURT ORDER OF A SUM CERTAIN. 
In the State of Utah, father has a duty to support his 
children, independent of any court order. Such is imposed by 
both state statute and common law. Utah has codified what the 
~ah Supreme Court has declared for years: Every man shall 
support his wife and child. Defendants-obligors are not excused 
from this responsibility and obligation merely because they have 
not previously been ordered by a court to pay a certa:i.n amount. 
A father's obligation to support his children is established 
~Utah Code Annotated 78-45-3(1953 as amended) which provides: 
"DUTY OF MAN (78-45-3) Every Man shall support his 
wife and his child." 
The Utah Supreme court in Ottley v. Hill 446 P.2d 301, 302, 
said in reference to this statute: 
"It was the duty of the plaintiff to support 
his son, if he is able to do so, and that duty 
is imposed by statute in this state." 
-4-
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Further, under the common law of this state, the duty of 
support is likewise well established. Pees v. Archibald 6 utah 
2r1 26~, 311 P.2d 788 (1957) states as follows: 
"This court has invariably emphasized 
the father's obligation to support his 
children based upon the elementary princi-
ple that the law imposes upon those who 
bring children into the world the duty to 
care for and support them during their 
minority and dependency." 
These specific requirements of support are not only of 
long time standing, but the legislature of the State of Utah 
has found it advantageous to spell out this responsibility in 
other areas. Utah Code Annotated 30-2-9 states as follows: 
"Family Expenses ... : 
"The expenses of the family and the education of 
the children are chargeable upon the property 
of both husband and wife or of either of them 
and in relation thereto they may be sued 
jointly or separately." 
Utah's sister states have likewise established appellants 
~s1tion that the father has the duty on continuing support. 
Alaska quoted Utah's Rees v. Archibald in Hougar v. Hougar 
449 P.2d 766 (1969) where in the court said: 
"A father has the primary and continuing obligation to 
support his children." 
Colorado has held in McQuade v. McQuade 358 P.2d 470 
Colo. (1960) that: 
"Both the common law and Colorado case law 
establish that the primary obligation for the 
support of a minor child lies upon its father." 
-5-
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POINT II 
TilE c,uTY OF SUPPORT IS ENFORCEABLE INDEPENDEHT OF ANY 
COL''<T ORDER OR DECREE FOR A SUM CERTAIN. 
Ut~h Code Annotated, Section 78-45-3, supra, provides a 
statutory duty of support for fathers. There is no need to 
establish that duty of support again by court order before the 
duty can be enforced. Further, Utah Code Annotated Section 
77-6la-2 (f) (as amended 1973) is a definition of "Duty of support" 
and says: 
"Duty of support includes any duty of 
support imposed or imposable by law, or by 
any court order, decree, or judgment ... " 
(Emphasis added) 
This duty of support may be imposed upon fathers in Utah 
then either by law or by court order. There is no requirement, 
~wever, of the latter being present before the former duty is 
enforceable. Either one is sufficient, independent of the other, 
ro establish an enforceable duty of support. 
Already referred to is utah Code Annotated 78-45-9 authoriz-
<ng enforcement of the obligor's duty. It states: 
"The obligee may enforce his right of 
support against the obligor and the state 
department of public welfare may proceed 
on behalf of the obligee to enforce his 
right of support against the obligor ... " 
(Emphasis added) 
Section 9 makes no mention whatsoever of a support order, 
-6-
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and thi,; is because the very purpose of 78-45-3, supra, is to 
establish an enforceable statutory duty of support. This then 
obviates the necessity of going to court to get an order before 
iln obligee is able to enforce a right of support in utah. 
This rationale is supported by Commissioners' statements 
about the purpose of the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, 
of 1vhich 78-45-3 and 9 are part; and also by 1'/illiam Brockelbank 
in his now famous treatise, Interstate Enforceme~t of Family 
~ort, 2nd Edition. In the Commissioners' Prefatory Note to 
the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, they enunciate as 
a basic purpose of the act the establishment of a statutory duty 
of support to be used in conjunction with URESA. (U.C.A. Matr., 
Fam. and Health Laws 133). The famous act was passed to eliminate 
confusion among lawyers who believed URESA was unenforceable with-
out a court order declaring a duty of support. Commenting on this, 
BroC'kelliank said: 
. ji/t is suprising to find /such/ 
misconceptions. One such is that only orders 
of support of one state will be enforced in 
another under the Act. In fact it is 'all 
duties,' and the d~, of course, may grow 
out of the order of support or a judgment 
or decree but is equally a duty if it never 
has_received judicial attention and now is 
the basis of litigation for the first time 
under the Act." (Emphasis added) 
Brockelban·>. and Infansto, Interstate Enforcement of Family 
-7-
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~poort, 2nd ed., 1971, p. 39. These "all duties" spoken of by 
Brockelbank encompass not only court orders of support, but 
statutory (such as 78-45-3) and common law duties of support 
as well. 
Thus, Utah Code Annotated 78-45-3 establishes a statutory 
right of support for children from their fathers, and 78-45-9 
Utah Code Annotated (1957) gives the obligee the right to enforce 
rl1is duty of support. Read together, there is no need to establish 
again by court order a duty of support before such duty can be 
enforced. 
California, with a support statute similar to Utah's law,in 
~s Angeles County v. Frisbie 122 P.2d 526, la Cal. 2d 634: 
"As so employed, these words, referable 
to the recoupment of sums already paid, in-
dicate the legislature's intention by this 
enactment to provide the county with 
authority to prosecute an ordinary cause of 
action for the recovery of money and nega-
tive the requirement of a judicial decree 
to determine the measure of the debt as the 
maintenance of such action." (Emphasis added) 
The language of the court is too clear to be mistaken: when 
the support obligation is established by statute, there is no 
need to go into to court and get a court order prior to an action 
for reimbursement based on the statute. 
Cases from nearly all jurisdictions across the United States 
are to numerous to recite. Lengthy annotations and many cases 
-8-
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--
support whnt Utah has nlready declared in Rees v. Archibald, 
~· and that is that the father has an absolute duty to care 
:or his family. 
POINT III 
T!Jr. STP1TE 01' UTAH ACTING AS A THIRD PARTY PROVIDING SUPPORT 
A.~SISTANCE TO A FATfillR' S MINOR CHILDREN, HAS A RIG l-IT OF REIMBURSE-
l\ENT AGAINST THE FATHER. 
The State of Utah, in order to establish a statutory duty of 
sJpport, has adopted the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, 
c.C.A. 78-45-l et seq. of which Section 9 provides for the en-
:orcement of the rights of support created by the act, and also 
provides a right of action for the state to secure reimbursement 
~r any support rendered to an obligee owed by an obligor. 
§78-45-9 states: "Enforcement of right to suppor':--
Powers of state department of public welfare. --The 
obligee may enforce his right of support against the 
obligor and the state department of public welfare 
may proceed on behalf of the obligee to enforce his 
right of support against the obligor. Whenever the 
state department of public welfare furnishes support 
to an obligee, it has the same right as the obligee 
to whom the support was furnished, for the purpose 
of securing reimbursement and of obtaining continuing 
support. Whenever such action is commenced by the 
state department of public welfare, it shall be the 
duty of the county attorney, of the county of 
residence of the obligee, to represent the state 
department of public welfare." (emphasis added) 
-9-
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The statute defines "obligor~~, 11 0bligee", and "state" as: 
(S-45-2. Definitions.--As used in this act: 
ill "State" includes any state, territory or possession of the 
united States, the District of Columbia and the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico. 
r2) "Obligor" means any person owing a duty of support. 
J) "Obligee" means any person to whom a duty of support is 
owed. 
Furthermore, the act imposes by law a duty of support upon 
~thers in the State of Utah making them as such an obligor, ie. 
a person owing a duty of support. 
'8-45-3 cited earlier.) 
(See Utah Code Annotated 
Therefore, whenever a father in the State of Utah fails to 
~ovide necessary support for his children, as is his statutory 
~~ and obligation, and the state has to step in and pay welfare 
~ the family, then the state has a right of action subrogated 
•o it by §78-45-9 to seek reimbursement. 
Although the exact meaning and interpretation of §78-45-9 
1as never been litigated in utah, it has been the subject of 
:·odicial interpretation in our sister state of California. The 
'Jniform Civil Liability for support Act, of which u.c.A. 78-45-9 is 
-10-
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a part, has been adopted by four states: Utah,California, New 
Hampshire, and Maine. 
california's interpretation came in County of Santa Clara 
v. Doll, 337 P.2d 582, in which a county was suing a father for 
reimbursement for support the county had rendered his illegitimate 
son when the man failed to do so. The court says in part: 
"It is the plaintiff's argument that the 
minor child Charles has the right to challenge 
his own presumed legitimacy and that being true, 
the county under the provisions of Civil Code, 
section 248, supra, may proceed on behalf of 
charles to enforce his right of support; that 
is, the county, has the same right as Charles 
to secure reimbursement and continuing support 
and that the county therefore succeeds to this 
right of Charles. But this is a nonsequitur." 
"The plaintiff's argument would be valid 
were there no question of illegitimacy in-
volved. That is, were this a simple case 
where the father, about whose identity and 
fatherhood there is no dispute, failed or 
refused to support his minor child, then, 
under the provisions of section 248 the county 
could enforce the child's right to receive 
such support." (emphasis added) 
Herethe court disallowed the recovery because of the 
unsettled illegitimacy issue; however, the court's language 
is clear that in a proper case, the statute would allow re-
imbursement. 
In New Hampshire the comparable statute was again the subject 
of litigation in Langevin v. Hillsborough County, 320 A. 2d 635. 
-ll-
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The supreme Court held that where the county had expended funds 
for care of neglected or dependent children, the county was 
entitled to reimbursement from the children's father. The Court 
said: 
"It is clear that the aid which the county provided 
to plaintiff William's children gave it a right of action 
to recover for such support against their father who was 
chargeable therefor either as support granted to dependent 
children or to neglected children." 
From the previous cases it is clear that the statute (U.C.A. 
~78-45-9) provides for and the various state courts have inter-
preted it to mean that a state has a right of reimbursement from 
the obligor anytime it renders support to an obligee. 
Even if it were not for the statutory right found in Utah 
Code Annotated §78-45-9, the state would have a right of third 
party reimbursement as a matter of common law. Although not all 
familial relationships owe each other a duty of support in the 
common law, it is abundantly clear that when a father fails to 
~ovide the necessaries to his child, the parent may, in a proper 
case, be held liable for necessaries furnished to the child by a 
third person. 
"It is a necessary consequence of the duty to support 
the child that the parent may, in a proper case, and some-
times as a result of express statutory provision, be held 
liable for necessaries furnished to the child by a third 
person, whether they are procured by the child or by the 
mother; and the mother has the same right as a stranger 
to recover from the father for necessaries furnished by 
her to the child, in the absence of any equitable reason 
-12-
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for imposing on her the father's primary obligation to 
support the child." 67 CJS §16 P. 698 
The rule of law allowing for third party reimbursement for 
support rendered to minor children has been clearly established 
in the common law of Utah. The leading case is Rees v. Archibald, 
suora. In that case the court held, notwithstanding a divorce 
decree, and even in the absence of a support order, that the 
father was liable for the expenses of necessaries furnished to 
his son by another. Justice Crockett's language is clear: 
"The law is well settled that a father is liable, 
even in the absence of express contract, to a third 
person furnishing necessities to his child." 
The law established by Rees, id, in Utah was followed and 
explicated plainly in the recent case of Baggs v. Anderson, Ut. 
2d , 528 P.2d 141(1974). There, the Supreme Court of Utah 
held that a third party's right to reimbursement for support 
supplied to a child from the failure of the parent to furnish 
support, belongs to whoever furnishes the support. The court 
said, as enunciated by Justice Crockett: 
"/I/t is appropriate to point out that support money 
can fall into two separate categories: First, the 
current and ongoing right of a child to receive support 
money from his father (parent) ; and second, the right to 
receive reimbursement for support of a child after that 
has been done." 
As to the first, the court indirectly made mention to it 
later in the opinion, saying: 
-13-
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and 
"For example, suppose an improvident or profligate 
mother (or father) ... deserted the child, the child would 
still have a right to support from his father (parent); 
and the latter cannot divest himself of that obligation, 
nor defeat the child's right to support." 
"As to the second, ~se a father (parent) fails 
over a period of time to furnish support of the child, 
and the mother, or someone else, furnishes it. That 
person then has the right to claim rei~)Ursement from 
the parent, the same as any other past debt. This right 
of reimbursement belongs to whoever furnished the support; 
and it is subject to negotiation, settlement, satisfaction 
or discharge in the same manner as any other debt. 
(Emphasis added) at P. 143. 
The language could not be any clearer: there exists in 
utah as a matter of common law a right for the state of utah to 
seek reimbursement from a father for support rendered to his child 
when he has failed in his duty to furnish it himself. 
The Supreme Court of Arizona best summarizes the position 
taken not only by our sister states, but most jurisdictions ln 
the United States. In Watkins v. Medical and Dental Finance 
~reau, Inc., 422 P.2d 696, 697, 698 (Ariz. 1967.) The Court said: 
"We agree that under certain circumstances a 
promise by a parent to pay for necessaries furnished 
his minor child by another may be implied if the 
parent has neglected to furnish the necessaries 
himself. Charbonneau v. Norton, 263 Ill. App. 341; 
Hard v. Gilbert, 205 Wis. 557, 238 N.W. 371; Kriedo v. 
~. 159 Md. 229, l50A. 720; Thompson v. Perr, 238 
s.w. 2d22(Mo. App.). Such an implied promise may arise 
from the recognized duty that a parent has to support 
his or her child. Barrett v. Barrett, 44 Ariz. 509, 
39 P.2d 621. 
-14-
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"The 'implied promisefor necessaries' doctrine 
was not formulated for the purpose of aiding enter-
prising third parties, but rather is a policy law 
meant to impel neglectful parents to assume responsi-
bility for their children's welfare." 
Thus, the common law of the state of Utah, as well as 
other states, provides a remedy for reimbursement of third parties 
who have rendered support to children, upon the failure of the 
natural parents to fulfill their legal duty to do so. 
There also remains a strong public policy argument in 
favor of allowing the state to recover support monies expended 
for needy children. It is reasonably plain from the course of 
the legislation described (78-45-l et.seq.) that it was the 
purpose of the Legislature to provide assistance for children in 
need of support, and to establish procedures by which their needs 
might be met at public expense as they arose, with subsequent 
reimbursement from parents capable of furnishing support. To 
allow an obliger to claim he is under no duty to reimburse the 
state would not only defeat the purpose of the legislature, but 
it would put an onerous burden upon the taxpayers of Utah by 
denying recovery of millions of tax dollars expended by the state 
for the support of children of parents who refuse to support their 
offspring themselves. 
Thus, by~ standard; statutory, common law, or public 
policy, the state of utah has a right to recover, as a third party 
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any monies expended for support of needy children from the obligor 
01ving the duty of support. 
POINT IV 
THE AMOUNT OF REIMBURSEMENT DUE THE STATE IS EQUAL TO 
1'/HATEVER SUM IT PROVIDED FOR SUPPORT OF THE CHILDREN, IN THE 
ABSENCE OF A COURT ORDER. 
Under Utah Code Annotated 78-45-9 as quoted earlie~ the 
state can enforce two separate rights of support. The first is 
the right to reimbursement for funds expended, and the second 
is the right of securing continuing support from the father of 
neglected children. The standard for securing the latter is 
provided for by statute, U.C.A. §78-45-7, which enumerates seven 
criteria for determining support. This statute, however, 
a~parently applies only to prospective support. As to the former, 
the legislature must have assumed the commonly accepted meani~g 
of "reimbursemen~ was so clear that there could be no dispute as 
to it. Perhaps they were right, as there has been no case law 
1n Utah interpreting the meaning of the word "reimbursement" in 
§78-45 -9. 
Fortunately, however, our sister state of California has 
litigated the point in dealing with the support statute very 
similar to our own. In the case of Los Angeles county v. FrisbQ~, 
~' the court was called upon to determine the meaning of the 
word "reimbursement" within the context of the California Welfare 
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stotute. The California Supreme Court said: 
"Preliminary to our consideration of the questions 
raised by the parties relative to the meaning of the 
pilrticular language employed in these code provisions, 
it is pertinent to observe that the object of all 
construction of statutes is to ascertain and give 
effect to the intention of the legislature ... The 
primary and ordinary meaning of the word 'rei~rse' 
is 'to pay back, to make restoration, to repay that 
expended.' Webester's New International Dictionary, 
Second Edition; Funk & Wagnall's Standard Dictionary. 
The actual amount due depends upon the sums determined 
by the board of supervisors to be representative of the 
county's expense for the relief granted." (Emphasis added) 
Here the court defined "reimbursement" as "to repay that 
expended," and further indicated the actual amount to be re-
imbursed was that sum which the county actually expended. Thus, 
even where a court order has not been previously entered as to 
a particular sum certain due for support, the amount due for 
reimbursement under U.C.A. §78-45-9 can quickly and simply be 
ascertained by determining the amount the state has expended for 
chil.d support. The former is equal to the latter. 
In Langevin cited earlier, the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
affirmed the findings of the trial court as to the amount of 
reimbursement due: 
" ... /T/he county is entitled to reimbursement from 
William Langevin relative to sums expended by the 
County for care of William Langevin's children." 
Thus, the court found the amount of reimbursement due was 
equal to the sum expended by the county. 
The utah Supreme court held in Anderson v. Anderson 110 
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Utah 300, 177 P. 2d l32 (1946) that where the defendant had 
failed to pay some past support money: 
"We see no reason why the court could not likewise 
require him to pay a sum equal to tiE installments which 
had been unpaid." at 307. 
By simply extending the court's reasoning to the instant 
set of facts, we see no reason why the court could not likewise 
require a defendant to pay a sum equal to the installments 
which had been paid by the state. 
It is therefore clear, by statute and the common law, 
that when the amount of reimbursement sought has not been 
previously determined by a court ordered sum certain, then the 
amount of reimbursement is simply equal to the amount expended 
by the third party for support of the children. 
CONCLUSION 
The real issue in these cases can be summarized as whether 
or not the State of Utah can seek reimbursement from obligors 
under U.C.A. 78-45-9, for assistance rendered to obligees, with-
out a court ordered sum certain duty of support. Appellants urge 
that the very purpose of the Uniform Civil Liability for Support 
Act, 78-45-l et. seq., of which 78-45-9 is a part, is to statutorily 
impose that very duty, and thereby negative the requirement of 
getting that duty declared by court order and having a sum certain 
set. 
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Appellants further urge that reliance on the District 
courts' construction and rationale of §78 -45-9 emasculates the 
law and negates the purpose for which the legislature passed 
the law. 
To say no amount of reimbursement is allowable simply be-
cause no sum certain has been previously ordered by the court, 
where there is a sum certain paid by the state, on behalf of 
Respondents' minor children, is to torture a simple issue. 
The equitable answer is that the amount of reimbursement 
due is equal to the amount the state paid out in assistance. 
Aside from the legal arguments, so strongly in favor of 
appellants' position, the public policy arguments are over-
whelming in favor of appellants position. It is unconscionable 
to force the taxpayers of Utah to carry any greater tax burden 
than is necessary, to support defendant-obligors' children when 
the law of Utah provides a remedy against them. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
FRANK V. NELSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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